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There has been a growing interest over recent years of intraparty competition within list PR 
systems allowing voters to cast preference votes. One of the main research goals has been to 
understand under which conditions we might observe the following three scenarios (Dodeigne 
& Pilet 2019): (1) a centralization of party competition with a leader attracting most preference 
votes; (2) an oligarchization of party competition, with a few candidates attracting most 
preference votes, and (3) decentralization of party competition with preference votes being 
spread across many candidates, from the most prominent to the less visible ones. 
 
From the perspective of voters’ behaviour, scholars have relayed on survey data in 
which voters are asked for which candidates they have cast a preference vote, and why (see 
Wauters et al. 2020 for a review on the Low countries). Another strand in the literature has 
examined the perspective of candidates by using aggregate electoral results: scholars calculate 
to what extent preference votes are dispersed, or rather concentrated, over candidates within the 
list (Katz and Bardi 1980, Wildgen 1985, Villodres 2003, Arter 2013, Dodeigne and Pilet 2021). 
The number of preference votes obtained by candidates were also studied to understand which 
candidates’ characteristics provide a vote-earning capacity advantage (Maddens and Putte 
2013, Van Erkel and Van Aelst 2016). Insights from these approaches have permitted to 
empirically highlight critical dimensions of the nature of intraparty competition within list PR 
systems.  
 
In this paper, we provide a new approach to the question by relying directly on a large 
sample of genuine ballot papers that we have been granted access to during few weeks after the 
2018 local elections in Wallonia (Belgium). In total, we have been able to consult and to recorde 
data from 47.239 electoral ballots, covering 4.906 candidates campaigning on 188 lists of 
candidates within 57 municipalities. This sample of ballots provide a unique opportunity to 
study – beyond the curtains of the voting booths – how voters support differently distinct types 
of candidates. It allows us (1) to examine how much preference votes voters cast and for which 
candidates, and (2) to understand what factors tend to increase (or limit) the number of 
preference votes cast. On that basis, we shed a new light on the debates on intraparty 
competition in list PR systems allowing for preference votes. We identify the factors leading 
voters to centralize intraparty competition by casting a vote on a single candidate, and in 
particular to the leader of the list. And we compare this behaviour with voters who rather 
support a few (up to five) or multiple candidates (six and more candidates). 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. We start by a literature review on earlier studies on 
intraparty competition and on preference votes in order to develop various hypotheses that 
explain variance in candidates’ electoral success. We then shortly present the context of the 
2018 local elections in Belgium and of the open list PR system with multiple preference votes 
that is used. In the third section, we present our unique dataset of ballot papers. We then move 
to analysing them. In the fourth section, we report on the number of preference votes cast by 
Walloon voters and assess the relevance of the factors affecting the number of votes cast. We 
conclude by discussing how these findings might affect the literature on intraparty competition 
in list PR system. 
 
1. Intraparty competition and preference voting: a literature review 
 
Most list PR systems allow voters to cast preference votes for one or several candidates. Only 
closed list systems (used in Spain, Portugal and Israel, for example) do not allow for such a 
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choice. In other list PR systems there is, therefore, a direct competition between co-partisans 
running on the same list. For any candidate, convincing a voter is not only convincing a voter 
to cast a vote for his/her party, but also persuading to vote for him/her personally. In other 
words, the personal vote-earning capacity matters to decide which candidates will receive the 
seats won by the party list. Building upon these premises, a growing body of literature has 
developed over recent years to study and understand the dynamics of intraparty competition 
under list PR systems allowing for preference votes. Several lines of research have been 
pursued.  
 
First, several authors have discussed conceptually what kind of configurations of 
intraparty competition could be identified. They have especially connected the study of 
intraparty competition to the literature on the personalization of politics. On this topic, Balmas 
and colleagues (2014) have stressed the importance to conceptually distinguish between 
centralized and decentralized personalization. The earlier refer to a growing importance of party 
leaders within parties, while the later points at the growing dispersion of power within parties 
towards a great variety of individual politicians, from the most prominent to the less visible 
ones. In terms of intraparty competition, a centralization would mean that one actor, the leader, 
dominate strongly electoral competition within the list by attracting most votes and most 
attention. By contrast, a logic of decentralization would mean that nobody dominates, but that 
votes within the list are spread across many candidates. In between these two logics, a few 
earlier studies have pointed at an intermediate situation. Personalization would not empower 
all politicians (decentralized), nor party leaders only (centralized), but a small set of top 
politicians (Ohr, 2011: 30; Holtz-Bacha, Langer and Merkle, 2014: 164). Lindqvist (2018) 
suggests referring to this trend under the label of ‘elitization’. Dodeigne and Pilet (0219) label 
it as ‘oligarchization’. 
 
A second line of research has, more empirically, explored which voters tend to cast 
preference votes more often, and for which reasons. Such an approach normally builds upon 
either voter surveys (Andeweg and Van Holsteyn 2012; Andre et al. 2012) or experimental data 
(Nagtzaam and Van Erkel 2017, Christensen et al. 2021). It has allowed to examine two things. 
First, how voters use their preference votes, that is for whom they vote (Holli and Wass 2010, 
Teney et al. 2010, Wauters et al. 2018, Marien, Wauters, & Schouteden, 2017, Janssen et al. 
2017). Second, when they can cast multiple preference votes, do they do it, and to what extent 
(Wauters et al. 2015, Wauters 2021)? On the later aspects, it appears that voter divide between 
those casting a vote for the leader only, or for the leader a few candidates, versus voters casting 
preference votes for one or several less visible candidates. The two questions are relevant for 
the broader debate on the nature of intraparty competition in its different forms (centralized, 
decentralized, oligarchized). Voters casting one or a few preference votes for a leader or a few 
prominent candidates concur to the centralization or oligarchization of intraparty competition. 
By contrast, voters casting many preference votes for a wide range of candidates, or preference 
vote only for second-order candidates would rather contribute to the decentralization of party 
competition. 
 
Finally, another body of research has examined empirically which candidates appear to 
benefit the most from preference voting. Some studies have looked at it by considering 
candidates’ performance in the election. This logic is first found in studies that have studied, 
and tried to quantify, the nature of intraparty competition within lists to capture how many 
candidates dominate, and to what degree preference votes within the list are concentrated 
around a few candidates. In this wake, Katz and Bardi (1980) suggested calculating how 
preference votes were dispersed among three subsets of candidates: top-of-the-list candidates, 
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middle candidates positioned just below them, and lay candidates positioned at the bottom of 
the list. This typology evaluated whether intra-party competition was dominated by a single 
leader, concentrated around a few candidates, or dispersed over many candidates. Other authors 
proposed rather to use indicators such as a GINI index of preference votes concentration 
(Wildgen 1985, Villodres 2003, Arter 2013). More recently, Dodeigne and Pilet (2021) 
combined a GINI index with another indicator, the Effective number of candidates. The latter 
measure is directly inspired from Laakso and Taagepera (1979) effective number of parties. 
 
Another way candidates’ performances have been analysed to study intraparty 
competition is by looking at which factors could influence the amount of preference votes 
obtained by candidates. Several factors have been isolated. In particular, it appears that 
established politicians, incumbents, tend to receive more preference votes (van Holsteyn and 
Andeweg, 2012, Thijssen, 2013, Maddens and Put 2013, Górecki and Kukołowicz 2014). It is 
even more salient for party leaders and the most prominent politicians such as ministers 
(Wauters et al. 2018). The incumbency advantage is due to the greater notoriety of incumbents 
among voters, but also to several indirect competitive advantages of incumbents and leaders for 
getting more preference votes. They often tend to occupy higher position on the list (Van Erkel 
and Van Aelst 2016, Söderlund et al. 2021). They can spend more money in campaign 
(Maddens 2006, Maddens and Put 2013). They receive more media attention (Van Aelst et al. 
2008; Van Erkel et al. 2020). Other studies have underlined that some sociodemographic 
characteristics of candidates might affect the share of preference votes received. In particular, 
candidates’ gender or ethnic background appear to affect their electoral performance within list. 
Yet, findings are not univocal regarding the direction of the relationships. Some studies would 
argue that male and native candidates tend to overperform female and ethnic minority 
candidates on average (Wauters, Maddens and Weekers 2010, Bergh and Bjorklund 2013). Yet, 
others would rather show that when controlling for factors such as incumbency, media attention 
or list position, the imbalance disappears (Thijssen and Jacobs 2004, Thijssen 2013). It could 
even be that female and ethnic minority candidates would attract more votes because they 
attract support from some voters would want to vote only for women or for ethnic minority 
candidates (Erzeel & Caluwaerts, 2015; Holli & Wass, 2010; Van Erkel 2019, Janssen 2020). 
Finally, a few studies have shown that candidates’ ideology, and in particular deviating a bit 
from party line might help candidates in attracting more preference votes (Isotalo et al. 2020). 
 
What is interesting in such studies for the broader discussion on the degree of 
centralization of intraparty competition is that they point at some factors that could push for 
more decentralization with a dispersion of preference votes, while others would concur to more 
centralization and concentration. For instance, factors such as gender and ethnicity or 
ideological distance can be mobilized by many candidates. They would therefore lead to voters 
spreading voters across more candidates, and to more decentralization. By contrast, factors such 
as incumbency, leadership, list position, media attention, or campaign expenses tend to give a 
competitive advantage to a few candidates and would therefore push for some form of 
oligarchization or even centralized personalization. 
 
2. Exploring preference voting on basis of ballot papers: hypotheses 
 
All the above-mentioned studies rely on two sources of data: aggregate electoral results in terms 
of preference votes or survey data that includes questions on how many preference votes 
respondents have cast, and for which candidate(s). Aggregate scores in preference votes are 
interesting since they cover all votes. Yet, they do not provide direct information on how 
specific voters have spread their votes on the ballot. We do not know precisely how many voters 
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have cast a voted one single vote, and for whom, nor how many have cast a vote for several 
candidates, and with which profile. Survey data could provide more information in that respect, 
but they only provide a limited number of observations as most election study would only 
include a few thousands respondents.  
 
In the present study, we propose a new approach thanks to a dataset of over 50,000 
ballots cast on the 2018 local elections in Wallonia (Belgium). Such a unique dataset provides 
a great opportunity to understand more precisely what share of voters opt for single preference 
voting, for limited preference voting and for extensive preference voting. The dataset also 
contains detailed information on the characteristics of candidates, of the list they belong to, and 
of the municipality in which they run for elections. We would therefore be able to explore which 
factors are more often associated to which type of preference voting (single, limited multiple, 
extensive multiple). 
 
And for answering this latter question, we can try to build up hypotheses on the basis of 
the literature presented in the previous section. A first range of factors appear to be the 
characteristics of candidates themselves. Some factors are resources only available to a few 
candidates, and therefore concurring to voters casting one or a few preference votes. The 
primary resource in that respect is holding an electoral mandate prior to running at elections. It 
could be a local mandate such as mayor, aldermen, CPAS presidents, local councillors, or a 
mandate at an upper level (regional, federal, and European) such as MP or minister. As 
elaborated above, it indeed appears that incumbent tend to attract more preference votes (van 
Holsteyn and Andeweg, 2012, Thijssen, 2013, Maddens and Put 2013, Górecki and Kukołowicz 
2014). Established politicians, and in particular the more prominent, have also been shown to 
lead to some form of centralization or oligarchization of party competition (Wauters et al. 2018, 
Dodeigne and Pilet 2021). We can therefore formulate the following hypotheses: 
 
H1. Incumbent politicians would obtain more often votes from voters casting one 
or a few preference votes than other candidates. 
 
H2. Prominent politicians (local mayor, MP and ministers) would attract more 
voters casting one or a few preference votes than other candidates. 
 
In the same logic, earlier studies have shown that candidates position higher on the list 
benefit from a competitive advantage over other candidates placed below on the list (Van Erkel 
and Van Aelst 2016, Söderlund et al. 2021). We would therefore formulate the following 
hypothesis. 
 
H3. Candidates positioned higher on the list would attract more voters casting one 
or a few preference votes than candidates with a lower position on the list. 
 
By contrast, another set of candidates’ characteristics would rather be associated with less 
concentration of preference votes. It is especially the case of candidates’ gender and ethnic 
background, which could lead some voters to cast preference votes in blocks for several ethnic 
minorities or female candidates (Teney et al. 2010, Marien, Wauters, & Schouteden, 2017). It 
would lead to the following hypotheses: 
 
H4. Female candidates would attract more voters casting extensive multiple 
preference votes than male candidates. 
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H5. Foreign candidates would attract more voters from voters casting extensive 
multiple votes than Belgian candidates. 
 
Lists’ characteristics may also affect the nature of intraparty competition as Wauters, Van 
Aelst, Thijssen and Pilet (2018) have demonstrated. Established parties are associated with a 
lower concentration of preference votes. It is the case for older parties, parties who have been 
in power and in larger parties. Such parties have had the time to consolidate a greater number 
of candidates that voters would be familiar with. It could lead to the following hypotheses: 
 
H6. Candidates running on lists that were in the incumbent local majority between 
2012 and 2018 would attract fewer voters casting a single or a few preference votes 
than candidates of the opposition. 
 
H7. Candidates on emerging lists would attract more voters casting a single or a 
few preference votes than other party lists. 
 
H8. Candidates from local lists would attract more voters casting a single or a few 
preference votes than other party lists. 
 
H9. Candidates from smaller lists would attract more voters casting a single or a 
few preference votes than larger parties. 
 
Finally, Dodeigne and Pilet (2021) have demonstrated that intraparty competition was also 
influenced by the context of the elections. Elections at lower tiers of government and in smaller 
districts tend to show higher levels of concentration of preference votes. We might expect to 
observe the same trend across Walloon municipalities. We can therefore formulate the 
following hypothesis. 
  
H10. Candidates running in the largest municipalities would attract lower voters 
casting a single preference vote than candidates from the smallest municipalities. 
 
 
3. The 2018 local elections in Belgium: case selection and data collection  
 
The 2018 local elections in Wallonia were organized under open list PR with multiple 
preference votes allowed. Voters can decide to vote on top of the list or to vote for minimum 
one and maximum as many candidates as there are seats to be filled within the list. Lists and 
preference votes are aggregated to allocate seats between lists (according to the Imperialli 
quota). Only preference votes are then considered for allocating seats within lists between co-
partisan candidates. Seats within lists are allocated to candidates with the highest number of 
preference votes, irrespective of their initial position on the list. It was the first time local 
elections were held with fully open lists in Wallonia (Belgium). Prior to the 2018 elections, a 
flexible list system was ever in place (Dodeigne, Pilet and Talukder 2020).  
 
As we discussed above, preference votes are typically studied via (1) aggregate scores 
in preference votes of candidates, or (2) on the basis of survey data asking respondents for 
which candidate(s) they have voted. With the first method, we can estimate the number of 
preference votes cast on a party list, but we do not have information on how voters cast those 
votes between candidates. Heuristically, the use of electoral surveys – and in particular mock 
ballots – has been a fruitful alternative research tool to better understand voters’ behaviour 
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(Jacobs et al., 2014; Marien et al., 2017). Despite the respective merits of such analyses, the 
final number of voters surveyed remain ultimately limited to a few thousands. It means that the 
number of respondents per lists is small, especially for smaller lists and in smaller 
municipalities. Robust analyses are, therefore, extremely reduced. 
 
To overcome this issue, researchers need access to real electoral ballots. Thanks to a 
collaboration with the Walloon Administration that has organized the 2018 local elections, we 
were granted such an exceptional access at the 2018 local elections in Wallonia. During a short 
window of opportunity of two months after the election and until the final destruction of the 
ballots (as required by the electoral legislation), we gathered an original dataset covering a 
representative sample of 51,198 electoral ballots (47,239 once blank votes are removed). The 
sampling procedure was set in four steps.  
 
Figure 1. Geographical distribution of the sample 
 
Provinces 
Level of urbanization  
Population Sample 
N % N % 
Hainaut 69 27% 15 26% 
Urban municipalities 2 1% 1 2% 
Mix municipalities 40 16% 8 14% 
Rural municipalities 27 11% 6 11% 
Liege 75 30% 17 30% 
Urban municipalities 7 3% 2 4% 
Mix municipalities 31 12% 7 12% 
Rural municipalities 37 15% 8 14% 
Luxembourg 44 17% 10 18% 
Mix municipalities 5 2% 2 4% 
Rural municipalities 39 15% 8 14% 
Namur 38 15% 9 16% 
Urban municipalities 1 0% 1 2% 
Mix municipalities 6 2% 2 4% 
Rural municipalities 31 12% 6 11% 
Brabant wallon 27 11% 6 11% 
Mix municipalities 18 7% 4 7% 
Rural municipalities 9 4% 2 4% 
Total 253 100% 57 23% 
 
First, we created a representative sample of 57 Walloon municipalities of the 253 
municipalities on three criteria (population size, degree of urbanization based on Eurostat 
classification), and the structure of party competition (according to the comprehensive analysis 
of Close, Dodeigne, Jacquet Matagne 2020). Secondly, within each municipality, we randomly 
drew a number of vote-counting stations. Votes counting stations are the bureaus where 
electoral votes from three polling stations are stored, merged, and counted by elections officials. 
Within each municipality, the number of votes counting stations selected varies from 2 to 9, 
depending on the population size of a municipality. Thirdly, we randomly selected large bags 
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in which ballot papers are stored. Within those bags, ballot papers are stored in envelopes. The 
content of an envelope is determined by the list that obtained the vote and divided as such within 
the large bags, for valid ballots. The last step of the sampling procedure was to randomly draw 
a sample of ballots within envelopes. Finally, we completed the dataset with variables at the 
candidate, list and the municipality levels (e.g. type of parties, size of the municipality, profile 
of candidates).  
 
Although our case selection primarily rests upon the unique opportunity of accessing 
real ballots, studying intra-party competition for local elections in Wallonia presents several 
merits for our research goals. Previous studies on intra-party competition for local elections in 
Wallonia has, for instance, established that they could be seen as an extreme case of intense 
competition among co-partisans running on the same lists (Dodeigne et al. 2020). And extreme 
cases are of particular interest to explore and test causal mechanisms (Gerring 2001). Moreover, 
Wallonia has just shifted to fully open lists for the recent 2018 local elections. This new rule 
may be expected to intensify even further between candidates within a list to secure a seat. 
 
4. Descriptive statistics on voters’ behaviors 
 
Based on the unique dataset that we have just described; we hope we will provide a fine-grained 
understanding regarding about how Walloon voters’ behaviour casting preference votes. The 
first analysis we are proposing is descriptive and aims at understanding how many preference 
votes appear to be cast on the 51,198 ballot papers that we have collected and coded.  
 
Firstly, we examine how voters behave in terms of the number of preference votes they 
cast. Five main groups of preference voters emerge (see table 1). The first group covers the 
majority of voters who opted for a single preference vote (52.2 percent). The size of the other 
four groups is substantially lower with a constant decreasing percentage of voters for each 
category (from 15.6 percent to 9.3 percent). Yet, we observe a slight increase for the last group 
(12.3 percent). The latter gathers voters who used in the most extensive way the possibility of 
preference votes casting six and more preference votes. These numbers tend to confirm the data 
gathered via former electoral surveys (but conducted at upper tiers of government) asking 
respondents how much preference votes they cast. Such studies have shown that between one-
quarter and one third of voters cast only a single preference votes, while very few candidates 
cast more than 5 preference votes (see André et al., 2014).  
 
Table 1. Distribution of preference votes cast according to different group categories  
 
 Single pref vote 2 pref votes 3 pref votes 4-5 pref votes 6+ pref votes Total 
% 52.2 15.6 10.4 9.3 12.6 100 
N 24,654 7,352 4,895 4,379 5,959 47,239* 
* The total number of ballots is lower than the original sample because of blank votes. 
 
These first figures indicate that we may distinguish between three types of preference voters: 
- Single-preference voters: 52.2% of all ballots marked with at least one preference votes 
- Limited multiple preference voters (between 2 and 5 preference votes): 35.2% of all ballots; 
- Extensive multiple preference voters (supporting 6 or more candidates): 12.6% of all ballots; 
 
The three types of preference voters might have different implications for the dynamics 
of intraparty competition. Single-preference voters could either push for a centralization of 
intraparty competition in case voters would mostly support one candidate (the leader) or a few 
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more prominent candidates (oligarchization). They might also push for the decentralization of 
intraparty competition if they coordinate badly and spread their unique preference votes across 
many candidates.  
 
Limited multiple preference voters could also have diverging effect. They would, by 
definition, not concur to a full centralization of intraparty competition as they vote for more 
than one candidate. But we do not know whether they would contribute to the emergence of an 
oligarchy of leaders within the list, or they would also spread their 2 to 5 votes over many 
different candidates. Block voting in favour of several female candidates or several ethnic 
minority candidates could contribute to such dynamics (Teney et al. 2010, Marien, Wauters, & 
Schouteden 2017).  
 
Extensive multiple preference voters seem to be easier to read. They cast a lot of 
preference votes and therefore contribute to a decentralization of intraparty competition. Yet, 
what is unclear is whether they vote for one prominent politician (first on the list, incumbent 
mayor or alderman, national politician) and for many other candidates. Or would they rather 
vote for many candidates who are mostly among the less prominent candidates on the list? In 
order to understand it more precisely, we move to a series of multivariate regressions in the 
next section. 
 
5. Results of the multivariate analyses 
 
In the next step of the paper, we seek to determine which factors of the candidates, lists, and 
municipalities’ characteristics explain why some candidates managed to concentrate preference 
on their mere individual merit whereas other candidates have difficulties to emerge on the lists 
as their supporters mostly vote for them but in combination with other co-partisans. Our 
dependent variable is thus operationalized according to the main conclusions of the previous 
section distinguishing three main behaviors in terms of preference voting: (1) percentage of 
preference votes obtained individually, (2) percentage of preference votes obtained with two, 
three or four other candidates, (3) percentage of preference votes obtained with five and more 
other candidates.  
 
We carefully remind the reader that our vantage point has now shifted: while the 
previous section has analysed the electoral behaviour of 47,239 voters in terms of preference 
voting; we now seek to assess how their behavior impacts the concentration/dispersion of 
preference votes from the viewpoint of 4,906 candidates. In this respect, table 2 shows that 
candidates can rarely claim that their electoral success is due to their mere individual merit: on 
average, hardly 12% of their total number of preference votes is based on a single preference 
vote, and 25% are cast combination with up to four co-partisan candidates. As a matter of fact, 
most candidates’ electoral performance often reflects extensive multiple preference voting: 
63% of the overall preference votes are obtained with five and more co-partisans. Interestingly, 
there is a significant variance between candidates as some of them obtained particularly higher 
scores in some of the three categories, it is this variance that we seek to explain via multivariate 
analysis. 
 
In order to test our hypotheses, our dataset of ballots was combined with official 
information about municipalities’ characteristics available via the Walloon administration 
(IWEPS and DGO5). We also rely on information about the 2018 elections regarding party lists 
and party competition (Close et al. 2021) as well as candidates’ biographies (Dodeigne 2018; 
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Dodeigne, Teuber, Vandeleene 2020). Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for these different 
variables. 
 




Dev. Min Max 
Dependent variable     
% Pref. votes obtained individually 0.12 0.13 0.00 1.00 
% Pref. votes obtained with 2, 3 or 4 other candidates 0.25 0.17 0.00 1.00 
% Pref. votes obtained with 5 or more other candidates 0.63 0.22 0.00 1.00 
Independent variable     
Lists' characteristics     
% Emerging state-wide parties 0.31    
% Traditional state-wide parties 0.45    
% Local parties 0.24    
List part of the incumbent local majority 0.39 0.49 0 1 
Party magnitude 6.72 4.60 0 23 
Municipalities' characteristics     
Population size 4,215 51,506 2,709 19,7355 
Log. of population size 10.05 1.07 7.90 12.19 
Effective number of parties 6.22 2.71 2 12 
Candidates' characteristics     
Relative position of the candidates on the list (0 to 1) 0.51 0.29 0.02 1.00 
Age of the candidate (continuous variable) 48.12 14.03 18.00 93.00 
Sex of the candidates (1= female candidates) 0.50 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Nationality of the candidates (1= foreign candidates) 0.01 0.08 0.00 1.00 
Mayors (1= holding the mandate) 0.01 0.09 0.00 1.00 
Aldermen (1= holding the mandate) 0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00 
CPAS presidents (1= holding the mandate) 0.01 0.09 0.00 1.00 
Councillors (1= holding the mandate) 0.34 0.13 0.00 1.00 
Parliamentary XP (1= holding the mandate) 0.19 0.02 0.00 1.00 
Cabinet XP (1= holding the mandate)  0.10 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Candidates with mandates at local and upper tiers 0.00 0.06 0.00 1.00 
 
Considering the structure of the data (4,906 candidates are nested in the 188 lists within 
municipalities), we specified a multilevel linear regression with a varying intercept for our three 
dependent variables, i.e. the average percentage of preference votes obtained individually, with 
two or four co-partisans and five and more other co-partisans. In this regression equation, β0j is 
the intercept, β1j to β15j are the regression slopes for the variables testing our ten hypotheses, 
and εij is the usual residual error term. The subscript j is for the lists within municipalities (j = 
1...J ) and the subscript i is for candidates running on lists (i = 1...nj )1. 
 




The results of the multilevel linear model are presented in Table 5 that assessed the 
impact of candidates, lists and municipalities’ characteristics on the share of candidates’ 
preference votes obtained individually and with other co-partisans. As predicted by our first 
two hypotheses, the candidates’ political capital has a statistically significant enhancing effect 
upon the concentration or the dispersion of preference votes on his/her candidacy. More 
interestingly, the results are particularly enlightening vis-à-vis the three concepts on intraparty 
competition we discussed above: centralization, oligarchization, and decentralization. While 
prominent politicians such as incumbent mayors, (national or regional) MPs and ministers tend 
to attract substantially much more preference votes on an individual basis than other candidates 
(respectively a positive effect of 15, 10, and 7 percentage points – i.e. more than one standard 
deviation); candidates with intermediary positions such as incumbent aldermen, CPAS 
presidents and local councillors present the strongest enhancing effects in small group voting 
with no more than 4 co-partisans. These latter findings seem to be in line with the 
oligarchization argument. Incumbent aldermen and councillors could be considered as mid-
level politicians in terms of notoriety. They attract more votes than lay candidates and 
concentrate to some extent party competition, but do not manage to concentrate most of their  
preference votes on the mere candidacy (enhancing effects of their mandates are about twice 
lower for single preference votes), contrary to mayors, MPs or ministers.  
 
By contrast, lay candidates without political capital are those who obtained the greatest 
shares of preferences votes when voters supported five or more other co-partisans (this is 
indicated by the negative for all variables associated with political capital in the third column, 
as candidates without political are the reference category of this binary variable). In that respect, 
these lay candidates concur to deconcentrate intraparty competition and to a more decentralized 
form of personalization. 
 
The same kind of logic is observed with candidates’ relative positions on the list. As we 
have seen in the literature review, candidates positioned higher on the list, and especially on 
amongst the few eligible positions, tend to attract more preference votes (Van Erkel and and 
Van Aelst 2016). Yet, we do not know whether the higher aggregate scores in preference votes 
stem from ballots with one, a few or many preference votes. We have, however, hypothesized 
(H3) that candidates positioned higher on the list will attract more votes from single-preference 
ballots because they are more often the “big fish” of the party list, which should lead voters to 
exclusively vote for them (see Wauters et al. 2018). In our multivariate regression, the variable 
relative position must be read as follows: the higher the score, the lower the candidate’s position 
on the list (1 indicating the last position of the list). We observe that this variable has a negative 
effect on the proportion of preference votes received from ballot with one or a few presence 
votes. By contrast, it has a positive effect on the candidates’ share of ballots with multiple 
preference votes. In other words, candidates with lower positions on the lists attract on average 
lower percentage of voters casting preference votes for those candidates (or for him and few 
candidates). And the opposite holds for candidates with better positions on the list: those 
Percentage of pref. votes obtained individually (or with other candidates) ij = 
β0j + β1j Incumbent majority j + β2j ENP j + β3j Party typesj+ β4j Party magnitude j 
+ β5j Log. population j + β6j Nationality of candidates ij + β7j Sex of candidates ij 
+ β8j Age ij + β9j Parliamentary XP ij + β10j Cabinet XP ij+ β11j Mayor ij 




candidates tend to secure a higher proportion of voters casting preference votes exclusively for 
them. H3 is therefore confirmed.  
 
H4 and H5 are about the differences between female and male candidates, and for 
candidates with nationalities other than the Belgian nationality. Our hypotheses suggested that 
female and ethnic minority candidates would receive mostly preference votes from voters 
casting extensive multiple preference votes. Here again, the multivariate regressions presented 
in table 3 confirms these expectations. Female and ethnic minority candidates do receive 
relatively fewer votes from ballot with single or a few preference votes, and relatively more 
from ballots with many preference votes - whereas Belgian male candidates are precisely 
advantaged in that category. In other words, with a lower percentage of single preference votes, 
those female and ethnic minority candidates face more challenges to emerge vis-à-vis their co-
partisan candidates. And contrary to some expectations, the higher proportion of multiple 
preference votes is not necessarily an electoral advantage for those female and ethnic minority 
candidates because they hardly benefit from “bloc voting” in our sample (i.e. voting only for 
female candidates or ethnic minority candidates). As a matter of fact, we observe that there are 
even slightly more “men only preference votes” (2,8% of the voters), than “women only 
preference votes” (2,3% of the voters). In other words, not only do male candidates secure more 
individual preference votes than female candidates, but when “bloc voting” is observed it is 
also in favour of the former (albeit the differences are limited). 
 
Table 3.  Multilevel linear model predicting share of candidates’ preference votes obtained 
individually and with other co-partisans. 
 
% Pref. votes 
obtained 
individually  
% Pref. votes obtained 
with two, three or four 
co-partisans 
% Pref. votes obtained 
with five and more co-
partisans 
List of the opposition -0.003 -0.03 0.03 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) 
Party type (ref.= established parties)   
Emerging party lists 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) 
Local party lists -0.01 -0.02 0.03 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) 
Party magnitude -0.01*** 0.004* 0.004 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) 
Municipality size (log. 
population) 0.04
*** -0.03** -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
Effective number of 
parties -0.01
* 0.01 -0.002 
 (0.003) (0.01) (0.01) 
Candidates with a 
foreign nationality -0.02
* -0.06*** 0.09*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
Female candidates -0.03*** -0.03*** 0.06*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) 
Candidates' age -0.001*** -0.0002 0.001*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) 
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Candidates cumulating 
mandates at local and 
upper tiers 
0.10*** 0.09** -0.19*** 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) 
Candidates with 
councillor mandate 0.04
*** 0.10*** -0.14*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Mayors 0.16*** 0.08*** -0.25*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
Aldermen 0.06*** 0.14*** -0.19*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Candidates with 
parliamentary XP 0.10
*** 0.07*** -0.17*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
Candidates with cabinet 
XP 0.08
** 0.03 -0.11** 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) 
Candidates with CPAS 
president XP 0.05
*** 0.12*** -0.18*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
Relative position of the 
candidates -0.07
*** -0.10*** 0.16*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Constant -0.11* 0.61*** 0.57*** 
 (0.06) (0.11) (0.16) 
N candidates 4,906 4,906 4,906 
N lists 188 188 188 
Log Likelihood 3,581.01 2,959.18 1,746.20 
Akaike Inf. Crit. -7,122.02 -5,878.35 -3,452.40 
Bayesian Inf. Crit. -6,992.05 -5,748.39 -3,322.43 
Key: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
We can now move to hypotheses related to the nature of the list on which candidates are 
running. We expect candidates campaigning on lists of the incumbent majority (H6), from 
emerging party lists (H7), from local lists (H8) and from smaller lists (H9) to present a relatively 
larger share of their preference votes from ballots with a single or a few preference votes. Here, 
findings are less neat. Candidates from emerging party lists receive relatively more votes from 
single-preference voters (H7). Candidates from larger parties receive fewer votes from single-
preference voters, and a bit more votes from ballots with a few preference votes (2 to 5) (H9). 
For the other configurations (H6 and H8), there is no statistically significant effects. In other 
words, the effects seem less salient at the list-level than the candidates-level characteristics. 
 
Finally, Dodeigne and Pilet (2021) have demonstrated that intraparty competition was 
also influenced by the context of the elections. Elections at lower tiers of government and in 
smaller districts tend to show higher levels of concentration of preference votes. H10 stems 
from that and suggests that in larger municipalities, candidates would receive fewer votes 
from single-preference ballots. Our findings do not really corroborate it. We can only see one 




Discussion and conclusion 
The goal of the paper was to shed a new light on voters’ behavior in open list PR system 
allowing voters to cast multiple preference votes. Analyses of such systems have so far relied 
on the study of the aggregate scores of candidates, or on survey data asking a few thousands 
voters to tell whether they have cast preference votes and for how many candidates. Yet, none 
of these approaches provide direct access to how precisely voters cast their preference votes on 
their ballot. Do they vote for one, several or many candidates? And what types of candidates 
do they support? For that, we need access to real ballots. It is what we have done in this study, 
having the chance to record more than 50,000 ballots of the 2018 local elections in Wallonia.  
 
This unique dataset has first shown that there were three main types of preference voting 
behavior. First, about one half of all ballots are marked with a single-preference vote for a single 
candidate. Then, about a third of all voters cast a few preference votes between 2 and 5 
candidates. Finally, a minority of voters, about 15 percent, cast preference votes for an 
extensive number of multiple candidates (6 or more).  
 
On that basis, we have tried to assess to what extent factors at the level of candidates, 
lists and municipalities explain the variance observed in terms of a candidate’s relative share of 
single preference votes, of limited multiple preference votes and of extensive preference votes. 
Our findings suggest that the main drivers are related to the candidates’ profile. In particular, a 
candidate’s political capital is a decisive explanatory variable to explain the types of preference 
votes received. On the one hand, prominent politicians (incumbent mayors, MPs and ministers) 
do attract disproportionally more single-preference votes than all other types of candidates 
while mid-level politicians (aldermen, CPAS presidents and to a councilor) secure mostly 
preference votes via group voting – and to a lower extent (twice as lower), via single preference 
votes. On the other hand, lay candidates without specific political experience or visibility attract 
disproportionally more votes via ballots with extensive preference votes. The same trend is 
observed in relation to candidates’ positions on the list. Candidates with the better positions 
(close to the top of the lists) attract relatively more ballots with a single or a few preference 
votes, whereas candidates lower on the list attract votes from ballots with extensive preference 
votes. Regarding the human capital of candidates, it appears that female candidates and ethnic 
minority candidates attract more often votes from ballots with many preference votes. On 
opposite, our results indicate that Belgian male candidates are more likely to emerge in the 
electoral contests because they manage to concentrate more (single, or few preference votes) 
on their candidacy. Finally, the other factors, at list and municipality levels, have limited or 
nuanced impact, if any.  
 
These elements bring interesting insights for the debates about intraparty competition. 
Established politicians concur to concentrate intraparty competition via the logic of centralized 
personalization (for the most prominent politicians) or of oligarchization (for mid-level 
politicians). By contrast, lay candidates without specific political capital seem responsible of 
decentralized personalization. In terms of human capital, specific sociodemographic traits 
(women, ethnic minorities) also contribute to deconcentrate intraparty competition, following 
the logic of decentralized personalization; whereas Belgian male candidates tend to trigger the 
logic of centralized personalization. These findings are not radically new. Yet, they are based 
for the first time on direct and robust evidence regarding how a large number of voters actually 
cast their vote on ballots in an open list PR system with multiple ballots. Last but not least, our 
findings confirm that the debate in the literature should move beyond the dichotomy between 
centralization and decentralization; and acknowledge the equal importance of the phenomenon 
of oligarchization in the dynamics of intraparty competition. 
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